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Watch 1467

WATCH COMMITTEE  
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## Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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**SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD**

1. **KOREA:** The enemy logistical build-up, recent troop movements and PW statements indicate that Communist forces in Korea are now prepared to undertake a major offensive, which may be launched at any time. As of 22 August, Communist forces were estimated to be capable logistically of sustaining a 46-division attack for 26 days and vehicle sightings since that date have reached an all-time high. Estimated Communist troop strength has been increased to 627,000. North Korean units are now estimated to be at full strength and CCF units at 80% of T/O. Two CCF armored divisions have been tentatively accepted in Korea with a total strength of 11,000 men and 160 tanks, thus increasing estimated enemy tank strength in accepted tank units to approximately 300. The North Korean 105th Tank Division has moved southward to Sariwon, there are numerous other reports of a steady forward movement of Communist troops, and some North Korean units are shifting to the east. A recent increase in enemy counterattacks may be a prelude to an offensive, and several PW's have reported that a general offensive is to be launched about the first of September. Reports of the presence of Soviet troops continue but can probably be attributed largely to the presence of advisors, technicians and AAA personnel. There are no new indications of enemy preparations to enlarge air operations over Korea in the near future. Communist propaganda has provided no new indication of intentions in the cease-fire discussions.
2. **JAPAN:** There continue to be no firm indications of the tactics which the Soviet delegation will pursue at the San Francisco conference, other than that the Soviets will apparently attempt to upset U.S. plans and that they have announced that they will make some "proposals" of their own. Soviet propaganda indicates that the particular target will be the military aspects of the treaty and that the U.S.S.R. will probably represent itself as the champion of the Asian nations. There are no indications as to what connection developments in Korea may have with Soviet proposals at the Peace Treaty discussions.

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3. **INDOCHINA:** The military situation continues relatively static and there are no clear indications of imminent large-scale Viet Minh operations or of a Chinese Communist intervention in force. Although evidence continues that substantial amounts of Chinese Communist military supplies are moving to the Viet Minh, the Viet Minh are reportedly suffering from rather serious economic and morale problems.
4. **BURMA:** Reports continue to suggest the possibility of a Chinese Communist incursion into northern Burma or increased Burmese Communist insurgent activity during September, but firm reports of Communist intentions are lacking.
5. **GERMANY:** Soviet field training continues to emphasize river-crossing training on the Elbe where some tactical units reportedly are participating with engineer units in river crossing exercises. Positive evidence of the assembly of large amounts of bridging equipment along the Elbe indicates that Soviet forces possess the capability of effecting extensive bridging operations. Apparent increased emphasis on airborne as well as river-crossing training this year suggests increasing attention to training of Soviet forces in specialized operations. No new movement of Soviet troops into Germany has been reported but the arrival of a unit or units (probably not more than a division in strength) in June-July is now accepted. The identity of these troops is not established and it may be a tank division from Poland or a new unit direct from the U.S.S.R. Soviet divisional strength in Germany possibly will be increased to offset the build-up of NATO forces. In addition to the program now underway to improve seven airfields in Germany, with completion probably scheduled for October, there are unconfirmed reports that seven other fields will also receive improvements. The number of twin-jet bombers in Germany is reportedly increasing.
6. **SATELLITES:** The modernization of the Satellite Air Forces continues with the observation of Yak-15 jets in the Rumanian Air Force, the probably assignment of MIG-15's to the Hungarian Air Force and the continued training of the Czech Air Force in MIG-15's. The AAA build-up in the Prague area continues. In both Poland and Hungary, there are indications that the call-up of the 1931 class may be under way slightly ahead of schedule and there is no evidence of the release or prospective release of older classes. The combat-readiness of the Bulgarian Army has been further increased with the assignment of the 1931 conscript class to tactical units and recall of large numbers of reservists. Nearly half the unit strength of the Bulgarian Army is now engaged in maneuvers on or near the Yugoslav border.
7. **PROPAGANDA:** Soviet propaganda has developed no new themes but has intensified the "hate America" and "peace" campaigns in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Considerable emphasis continues to be placed on the issue of East-West trade.

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**CONCLUSIONS**

1. The Soviet Armed Forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with little or no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of controversial problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies, in pursuing their major objectives, intend necessarily to avoid actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
2. Indications are that Communist forces in Korea are prepared to undertake a major offensive, that they are capable logistically of sustaining it for at least 26 days, and that the attack may occur at any time. There are no clear indications of their intentions with regard to continuation of the cease-fire discussions.
3. Further major Chinese Communist military operations, other than in Korea, do not appear to be imminent. Support of the Viet Minh appears to be gradually increasing.
4. There are no firm indications of Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities in Europe or the Near East in the near future. The availability of large amounts of bridging equipment in Germany, the nature of Soviet training and the continuing build-up of the Satellite ground and air forces reflect the steady increase in Communist military preparations in Europe.
5. No firm conclusion can be reached as to the nature of the next Soviet move but the weight of evidence points to the Far East as being the focal point of current Soviet interest. The nature of possible Soviet action is not clear. There are strong indications, however, that a major Communist offensive is impending in Korea.

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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. KOREA.

- (1) Ground. Cumulative and continuing evidence of the enemy logistical build-up, together with recent reports of a southward movement of armor and PW statements of an impending offensive, indicate that Communist forces in Korea are now prepared to undertake a major offensive, which may be launched at any time. FECON has estimated that enemy forces had accumulated, by 22 August, sufficient supplies to support a 46-division attack for a period of 26 days. Subsequent to that date, sightings of enemy vehicular traffic have reached an all-time high, averaging 2577 over a five-day period during the past week. The high level of vehicle sightings during recent weeks, which included a total of nearly 4000 on 24-25 August, indicate that enemy forces are now employing at least 6000 to 10,000 trucks and have thereby increased their capabilities to sustain an offensive. Recent sightings have also included a considerable increase in the number of trains and locomotives, particularly along west coast routes.

The estimate of Communist troop strength in Korea was increased by 132,000 this week to a total of 627,000, based largely on the cumulative evidence of an increase in the average strength of units and also on the tentative acceptance of the presence of two CCF armored divisions. North Korean units are now estimated to be at full T/O strength and CCF units at 80% of T/O strength. The 1st CCF Armored Division has been tentatively accepted in the Singyo area (about 40 miles north of Kaesong) and the 3d CCF Armored Division is believed to be between Wonsan and Yangdok. These divisions are believed to have a T/E of 80 tanks and a strength of 5500 men each. These tanks, together with those of the North Korean 105th Tank Division, have brought the estimated enemy tank strength to approximately 300. Reports indicate that this North Korean tank division has recently moved some 40 miles south of Pyongyang to Sariwon, while one report indicates that the 1st CCF Armored Division is also moving southwest from Singye to Namchonjom. One report stated that armor, artillery and 20,000 troops were moving from Namchon to the Songjin-Chongjin area. Also many reports have indicated a steady forward movement of Communist troops. The 60th CCF Army is accepted as moving southwest to the vicinity of Singye and there are many reports that

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the North Korean I and VI Corps are shifting towards the eastern end of the battle line. There has been no additional reliable evidence of the movement of new CCF units, other than armored, to Korea.

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In addition to the forward movement of enemy troops, a recent increase in enemy counterattacks may be a prelude to an offensive. According to several recent PW statements, a general offensive is to be launched on 1 September or shortly thereafter; prisoners have reported that the order for the offensive has been issued by Kim Il-sung and that the date may have been postponed from 15 August to 1 September.

There are continuing reports of the presence in Korea of Soviet troops, but no Soviet units, as such, have been identified, and it is believed that the reports can largely be attributed to the presence of advisors, technicians and AAA personnel. A recent report alleges that some 3000 Soviet troops are in the mountains east of Kaechon and that smaller numbers are in Sariwon and Kwansong-Ni. In addition to the possibility that Soviet AAA personnel may be increasing, it appears likely that increasing numbers of Soviet technical personnel may have been assigned in connection with the build-up of Communist mechanized forces.

- (2) Air. There have been no indications of a change in Communist intentions with respect to the employment of air power in Korea. The enemy continues to maintain a sporadic air defense of the Yalu River area, but there are no new indications of preparations substantially to enlarge air operations in the near future, either independently or in conjunction with a ground offensive.
- (3) Political. There has been no clear indication in Communist propaganda as to their intentions with respect to a continuation of the cease-fire discussions. The major propaganda effort during the past week has been devoted, however, to charges that the U.S. is attempting to conclude the talks.

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Pravda also carried an item asserting that U.N. forces had launched an attack just as the Communists were showing a desire to "compromise on the demarcation line."

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Tass representative in Paris in a private conversation on 23 August, stated that the Kaesong talks had been only temporarily suspended, that a solution would be found, and that Moscow is "eager" to end the war.

The Soviet press on 16 August referred to one Razuwayev as the Soviet Ambassador to Korea; this is the first indication that T. F. Shtykov has been replaced. Although not positively identified, the new Ambassador is believed to be Lt. General V. N. Razuwayev whose career has been entirely military and who has had no previous diplomatic assignments.

b. JAPAN. There continue to be no firm indications of the tactics which the Soviet delegation will pursue at the San Francisco conference, other than that the Soviets will presumably seek to upset U.S. plans and that they have announced that they will make some "proposals" of their own. It cannot be determined whether those will include an entirely new treaty proposal or amendments. Soviet propaganda indicates that the particular target will be the military aspects of the treaty and that the U.S.S.R. will probably represent itself as the champion of the Asian nations who suffered most from Japanese aggression. Several Soviet press items during the week gave particular emphasis to U.S. military agreements with Japan, while one Literary Gazette article implied that the U.S.S.R. would play the role of a peace-loving nation seeking to settle issues by negotiation in contrast to U.S. rejection of "any kind of cooperation at the conference." The possibility that the U.S.S.R. may attempt to initiate bilateral discussions with the U.S. has been suggested

There have, however, been no other indications that the Soviets are seriously seeking bilateral talks. There continue also to be no indications as to what proposals, if any, the Soviets may make at San Francisco with regard to Korea or as to whether military and political developments in Korea are being timed to coincide with the Japanese Peace Treaty discussions.

A Soviet freighter which has regularly arrived in Japan at two-month intervals with supplies for the Soviet Mission has apparently advanced its next arrival from late September to between 4-10 September. While there is some possibility that this development may be connected with the opening of the Peace Treaty discussions, other factors may well account for it, and the significance of the apparent change, if any, is not known.

c. CHINA. There continue to be no indications of significant preparations in South China which would point to an early attack on Formosa or Hong Kong. Another report has been received referring to Chinese Communist expectations of a "coming world war" and of defensive measures in South China purportedly to be completed by October. There was no suggestion of plans for further Chinese Communist military action beyond her borders.

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d. **INDOCHINA.** The military situation continues to remain relatively static and there have been no clear indications of imminent large-scale Viet Minh operations or of a Chinese Communist intervention in force. Recent reports increasingly suggest that the Viet Minh are suffering from morale problems and encountering serious difficulties in feeding both their civilian and military personnel. At the same time, there are indications that this condition is being offset to a certain extent by increasing Chinese Communist military aid in the form of supplies and there are some further suggestions that the infiltration of personnel into the Viet Minh units may be on the increase. One source has reported an "intense" movement of military supplies from China to Viet Minh territory during the last month and that the Viet Minh are very well supplied in arms and ammunition despite deteriorating economic conditions. If conditions within Viet Minh territory continue to deteriorate, the possibility of overt actions by the Chinese Communists to retrieve the situation is likely to increase. Meanwhile reports, which have not been confirmed, of a northward movement of some Viet Minh forces could indicate that a redepositioning of forces is under way for a major offensive against the Red River Delta area.

e. **BURMA.** One report of late July stated that early Chinese Communist occupation of the Fort Hertz area (Northern Burma) has been rumored in the Kachin State. The possibility that the Chinese Communists might begin a move into northern Burma at the end of the rainy season in September has been suggested by this and other recent reports, and preparations for an incursion into northern Burma by Burmese Communist Party personnel now being training in Kunming have also been alleged. Apart from continuing indications of a concentration of Burmese insurgent effort in the north, however, firm reports of immediate Communist intentions in the area are lacking.

## 2. Indications of Intentions in Europe.

### a. **GERMANY.**

- (1) Soviet Ground Force Field Training. There are indications of continued river-crossing training by Soviet field forces in Germany, together with some reports of training in airborne operations and good evidence of extensive night training. Engineer units from at least four of the six Soviet armies are still reported training at different locations on the Elbe River, generally from Dessau north to Stendal, and there is evidence of participation as well by tactical units (including elements of mechanized and rifle divisions) in the river-crossing exercises. Information is somewhat conflicting on the scale of current maneuvers. Training appears on the average to remain at about battalion level, although exercises on a larger scale may be under way in the area generally north of Stendal and probably also near Dessau. Positive evidence of the assembly of large amounts of bridging equipment at points along the Elbe and the apparent general level

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of proficiency in handling it indicate that the Soviet forces possess the capability of effecting extensive bridging operations. The apparent increased emphasis on river crossing training this year, together with larger numbers of reports of training in airborne or airlift operations, suggest that increasing attention is being devoted to training of Soviet forces in various types of specialized operations.

- (2) Troop Movements. There has been no new evidence during the past week to indicate the arrival of additional Soviet troops in Germany. However, the previously reported movement of Soviet troops (probably in no more than division strength) from Poland into Germany via Goerlitz during late June and early July is now accepted. The most probable present location of these troops is the Weisswasser training area near the Polish border. The unit identity of the troops involved in this movement has not been established, although there is some possibility that they may be the Soviet 20th Tank Division from the Northern Group of Forces in Poland. The barracks at Oppeln formerly occupied by this division are reported now to be occupied and under rehabilitation by Polish troops. It is not yet apparent, however, that the 20th Tank Division has permanently departed from its barracks in Poland or that this division is not now in its normal training area in southwest Poland. An equal possibility exists that the troops which entered Germany at Goerlitz may be a new unit direct from the Soviet Union. In any case, the U.S.S.R. is possibly planning and may already have begun an increase in its divisional strength in Germany to offset the increase of NATO strength and to maintain the relative numerical superiority of Soviet forces in Europe. It appears probable that any increase in Soviet divisional strength in Germany would include the assignment of additional forces to the First and Second Guards Mechanized Armies, each of which lack one mechanized division to be equal to a normal mechanized army.

A correction to information received last week reporting an unusual occupancy of Soviet barracks at Dresden now indicates that the troop strength there is not abnormal and that troops of the Headquarters of the First Guards Mechanized Army, normally quartered there, are the only forces identified at Dresden.

- (3) Soviet Air Activity. There are indications that the U.S.S.R. is continuing to improve its overall air capabilities in Germany. In addition to the program now under way to improve seven airfields, with completion probably scheduled for October, there are unconfirmed reports that seven other airfields have been earmarked for improvement.

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Those include fields at Erfurt, Forleburg, Strausberg and possibly Drewitz, Schkeuditz, Ziesar and Guestrów. Two recent unconfirmed reports are consistent with the expected continuation of the Soviet bomber reequipment program which began in April 1951. [redacted]

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[redacted] there are twelve Type 27 twin-jet bombers now stationed at Cottbus Airfield (about 60 miles southeast of Berlin), and another report states that the count of Type 27 twin-jet aircraft at Jueterbog-Alteslager Airfield is now 100. This is the first report that Type 27's may be at Cottbus and, while the report on Jueterbog is regarded as excessively high, it is possible that there are now more than the 33 twin-jet aircraft currently accepted at this field.

**b. SATELLITES.**

(1) Air and Air Defense Activity. Recent reports indicate that the modernization of the Satellite Air Forces is continuing. At the Liberation Day ceremonies on 23 August, the Rumanian Air Force displayed 15 Yak-15 jets bearing Rumanian markings, along with 24 conventional fighters. This appears to confirm previous reports that a transition program in jet training for Rumanian pilots is well under way. In Hungary, MIG-15's with Hungarian markings have not as yet been observed. Jet transition training of Hungarian pilots is accepted, however, and the observation at Budapest of some MIG-15's with no markings whatsoever may indicate that they are intended for the Hungarian Air Force. Transition training in MIG-15's by the Czech Air Force continues at a slow pace at Milevice Airfield near Prague. Evidence continues of an AAA build-up in the Prague area. In addition to previous observations of four 88mm AA guns in the area, eight more guns of the same type (four of them excellently camouflaged) have been seen in a suburb just north of Prague. It is estimated that there are about 200 88mm AA guns in all of Czechoslovakia.

(2) Satellite Ground Forces. There are indications of the continued build-up of the Satellite armed forces, with some evidence that the class of 1931 is being called up earlier than anticipated in two countries. [redacted]

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[redacted] some members of the class of 1931 are now receiving pre-induction physical exams in Warsaw. These examinations, somewhat earlier than anticipated, precede the autumn conscriptions which normally occur in October. In Hungary, the induction of the 1931 age group has been reported by several independent refugee sources. Autumn is the usual induction period and while individuals of the 1931 class have possibly been called, it is doubtful that

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the entire class has been inducted. In neither country have there been reports of the release or prospective release of older classes now in service.

In Bulgaria, according to a Sofia broadcast, conscripts of "all military units" took the oath of loyalty on 19 August, providing confirmation that the 1931 conscript class has completed its basic training and that its estimated 45,000 members are now ready to be absorbed into tactical units. This development together with the presence of large numbers of combat-fit reservists on active duty, will further increase the combat-readiness of the Bulgarian Army which is now believed capable of offensive action with little or no additional preparation.

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[redacted] fresh Bulgarian troop reinforcements were stationed along the entire Yugoslav border during July and military installations are being built and reinforced in mountainous regions along the border to a depth of 60 miles. There is no evidence that army units have actually taken over the security of frontier regions, but almost half the unit strength of the Bulgarian Army is engaged in maneuvers near the Yugoslav border, although there is no significant concentration at any point. Field fortifications have been constructed along the border but the extent of the fortifications is not known.

### 3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

PROPAGANDA. Soviet propaganda during the past week developed no new themes. The "hate America" campaign continues in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and in Rumania Marshal Voroshilov in a militant speech predicted the overthrow of capitalism. Meanwhile Moscow's "peace" campaign received new impetus with the opening of the official Soviet drive for signatures to the W. P. C. appeal for a Big Five Peace Pact. "Peace" propaganda generally continued to underscore the gravity of the international situation, and to seek to divide the Western Powers over NATO. Soviet propaganda continues to place considerable emphasis on the issue of East-West trade, while there is further evidence of Soviet and Satellite efforts to procure strategic materials, as well as ships and tankers in bilateral trade negotiations with Western European countries.

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